University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

9-17-1963

People v. Parham
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, People v. Parham 60 Cal.2d 378 (1963).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/710

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

( )

378

PEOPLE V. PARHAM:

[Crilll. Xo. 7428.

In Bank.

[60 C.2d

Sept. 12, 1963.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALVIN
MAURICE PARHAM, Defendaut and Appellant.
[1] Robbery-Evidence--Identity of Accused.-Dcfl.'lldant's identification as the robber of three banks· was supported by evidence that severnl witnesses picked defendant out of a police
lineup as the robber and by their ndditional identification of
him at the trial, and the fact thnt during the lineup the other
participants then'in tried on defendnnt's hat and coat, which
allegedly did not fit nny of them, did not make the witnesses'
identification unreliable and prejudicial; the manner in which
the lineup was conducted afIeeted only the weight of the
witnesses' testimony, not its admissibility.
[2] Contempt-Defense--Inability to Comply With Order.-An
executive order of the United States Attorney General forbidding an elllployee of the Department of Justice from producing or disclosing information in the files of the department is valid and has the force of federal law, and a trial
court may properly refuse to hold in eontenlpt an agent of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation who, pursuant to such
order, withheld information as to statements of witnesses
taken by the F.B.I. which defendnnt sought to examine.
f3] Criminal Law-Trial-Inspection of Papers.-In a robbery
prosecution, the prosecutor was entitled to use the testimony
of certain witnesses even though their signed statements made
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation were not produced for
defendant's inspection where such statements were in the
possession of the Department of Justice, not the prosecution,
and were withheld pursuant to an executive order of the·
United States Attorney General, where the prosecution did
not withhold the statements but on the contrary made every
effort to obtain them from the F.B.I., and where there was
nothing to show that the police conspired with the federal
agents to deprive defendant of the statcments.
[4] Arrest-Without Warrant-Reasonable Cause: Searches and
Seizures-Incidental to Arrest.-There was probable cause

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 49; Am.Jur., Contempt (1st ed
§ 72).
[3] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Trial, § 383; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed
§ 917) ; Triul (1st ed § 113).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Robbery, § 33(1); [2] Contempt,
§ 33; [3] Crilllinal Law, § 272; [4] Arrest, § 12(13); Searches and
Sl'iZUl'('s, § 24; [5] Robbl'l'Y, § 46; [6] Criminal Luw, § 409.
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for defendnnt's nrrest as a suspectC'd bnnk robhC'r where the
arresting ornerr knew a ;,tol('n cnr had bt'l'n used in a bank
robbery and abandoned in the al"t'1i in which defendant WIlS
found, where ddendnnt gave the orneer nn unlikely explanation of his prt'srnce there, jnstifying' the officrr's r('C}uest
for identification, whert' the officer cnl1l1ert('d the dC'~cription
given on defC'ndant's driver's license with a dl'scription of the
bank robber, with which he was familiar, wlll're the officer
saw a folded piece of pink paper, which hc thought was a
check, in dcfcndnnt's possession when he produced .his driver's license nnd was justified in latcr asking to see it, and
where defendant then put the check into his mouth and began chewing it; a subsequent search was incidC'nt to the arrest and was thus lawful.
[5] Robbery-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-In a robbery
prosecution in which it appenred that after a struggle of five
to seven minutC's during' which one officer wl'('stled with defendant and another omc('r applied prrssure to defendant's
cheeks, defendant vons struck twice on the back of the neck
with a police club causing him to spit out fragments of a
check th:1t he was chewing, 811l'h conduct on the officers' part
was unreasonable Ilnd in violation of due process, but the
improper admission into evidence of the check frngments was
not prejudicial where the check, though relevant, was merely
cumulative of other undisputed evidence in the record, and
where the other evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming.
[6] Criminal Law-Evidence-Evidence Wrongfully Obtained.That illegally obtained evidence has been admitted does not,
except in the case of admission of an involuntary confession,
require automatic reversal without regard for prejudice when
there is compelling legally obtained evidence of guilt. (Disapproving any implication to the contrnry in People v. Erick.on, 210 Cal.App.2d 177, 183 [26 Cal.Rptr. 546].)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Alameda County and from an order denying a new trial.
William J. McGuiness, Judge. Judgment affirmed; appeal
from order dismissed.
Prosecution for robbery. Judgment of conviction of first
degree robbery affirmed.
Paul Robbins, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, .John S. McInerny, Eric
Collins and Albt'rt \V. Harris, Jr., Dt'puty Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J,-Defendant was convicted on three counts
of first degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211a.) He appeals from
the judgment and from the order denying his motion for a
nt'w trial. The appt'al from the order denying a new trial is
dismissed. (Pen. Code, § 1237.)
Defendant contends that he was denied the right to inspect
the signed statements of several witnesses and therefore was
denied a fair trial, that he was placed in an improperly conducted lineup and therefore his identification by several witnesses was unreliable and prejudicial as a matter of law,
that he was arrested without probable cause and therefore
the search incident to his arrest was unreasonable, and that
when he was arrested the police forced evidence from his
mouth by unconstitutional methods.
[1] Defendant was arrested on July 21, 1961, and on the
same day was placed with five other men in a police lineup
at the Berkeley Police Station. During the lineup, each man
in turn tried on defendant's hat and coat. After observing
the lineup several witnesses of the three bank robberies for
which defendant was cOllvicted identified defendant as the
robber. '1'hese witnesses also identified defendant at the trial.
Defendant contends that his hat and coat did not fit any of
the other men in the lineup and that therefore the witnesses'
identification of him was unreliable and prejudicial. This
contention is without merit, The manner in which the lineup
was conducted affects only the weight of the witnesses' testimony, not its admissibility. The witnesses were thoroughly
cross-examined concerning the lineup, It was the jury's
function to consider the circumstances of the lineup in weighing the witnesses' testimony. The jury's implied finding that
identity was established is supported by the evidence.
At the trial most of the identifying witnesses testified that
after the lineup they gave signed statements to agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Defendant moved for production of the statements. The prosecution responded that
the statements were not available to it. Inspector Young (If
the Berkeley Poliet' was present when the witnesses were interviewed by the F.B.I. and took notes of the interviews but
did not take signed statements. Defendant was given a copy
of Inspector Young's notes and also the statt'mellt of one
identifying witness taken by the Berkeley Police.
In cllambers the proseeutor stated that he had been permitted to examine the statements taken by the F.B.I., that he
had tried to obtain the statements but that the F.B.I. had
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rejeeied his I't'qllt'st, and that he did not have the statements
in his possl'ssioll all11 no longer had access to them. Upon the
trial cOllrt 's ~tlg'g'I·"ti{)11 defendant then obtaincd a subpoena
duces teeLllll tlil't'l'tillg' Special Agent Buchanan of the F.B.I.
to appeal' with the investigative file on the bank robberies.
Agcnt Buchanan appeared with an assistant United States
attOrlH'Y \rho 1Hl\-isl'd the court that Agent Buchanan could
not produl'c tl1l' inwstigative file because of order No. 3229 of
the Attol'lH.'Y G(,l1eral of the United Statps. Agent Buchanan
testifi"d that IJ(' had delivered the file to the assistant United
States attorl1l~.\· and that he could not testify concerning the
contents of thc file because of order No. 3229. Defendant's
motion that Agent Buchanan be held in contempt was
denied. Tilt, COUl't also denied defendant's subsequent motion
to strike the testimony of all witnesses whose signed statements had 110t been produced.
[2] Order No. 3229 compelled Agent Buchanan to refuse to
produce the F.B.I. file. l That order is valid and l1as the force
of federal law. (United States ex reI. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S.
462 [71 S.Ct. 416, 95 L.Ed. 417]; Jackson v. Allen Industries, Inc., 250 F.2d 629.) The trial conrt was therefore boullfl !
by the executive order and properly refused to hold Agent I
Buchanan in contempt. (See Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S.
459 [20 S.Ct. 701, 44 L.Ed. 846] ; Appeal of United States
Securities &- Exchange Corn., 226 F.2d 501, 516-520; Ex parte
Sackett, 74 F.2d 922; In re Valecia Condensed Milk Co .• 2-l:0
F. 310; Stegall Y. Thurman, 175 F. 813; In re Weeks, 82 F.
729; In re Huttman, 70 F. 699; Hubbard v. Southern Ry. Co.,
179 F. Supp. 244.)
[3] Defendant contends that because the signed statements
were not produced he was deprived of a fair trial by the
denial of his motion to strike the witnesses' testimony. Had
the witnesses' statements been in the possession of the proselOrder No. 3229 provides that when an employee of the Departmcnt
of Justie.e is served with a Bubpoena or order to pro,luce information
in the files of the department, a representative of the United States
attorney shall appear with the employee and inform the court that the
employee is not authorize.l to produce or disclose the information
songht. Time must then be requestcJ to refer the mattcr to the At·
torney Gellcral. In tl.:8 case the assistant United States attorney
stated that he would ,·olnlllunic·,tte with the Attorn('y G,'ncral unll
ntldse Il.c rourt if he were given any other instrudions. Defense
"onllsel thereafter ('on('c'led th:lt the st:,tpmcnts could 110t be prod"t'pt!, awl the ,-o, ... t dl'lti,·,l the Illotion to holt! ,\gent Buchanan in
(·(llllc·ltlpt. (II! Ft:d. nl'g. 13fj~.)
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cution an order to produce would have been proper. (People
v. E~trada, 54 Ca1.2d 713, 716 [7 Cal.Hptr. 897, 3jj 1'.2<1
641] ; People v. Chapma 11, 52 Cal.2d 9;), 98·99 [3:38 P.~d 428 J ;
People v. Riser, 47 Cal.~d 5G6, 585-588 [305 P.2d 1].) Moreover, had defendant been prosecut('d under federal law the
statemellts could have been produced under the Jencks Act.
(18 U.S.C.A. § 3500.) It does IIOt follow, however, that the
use of the witnessl's' testimony even though tlll'ir prior statements were unavailable deprived defendant of a fair trial.
The prosecution did not withhold the stateme'nts, but on the
contrary made every effort to obtain them from the F.RI.
The prosecution cannot be penalized because those efforts
failed. The prosecution is not penalizl'd if, throug-h no fault
of statc officials, a material witness for the defe!lse is Ullayailable at trial. (People v. Wade, 118 Cal. 672, 6n [50 P.
841] ; People v. Williams, 168 Cal.App.2d 624, 626-627 [336
P.2d 245] ; see People v. Collins, 195 Cal. 325, 333 [23:3 1'.97].)
It does not appear that the statements werc unayailable
because of any improper activity by state officials. Th~' p(llice
were und!'r no compulsion to take sta trmrnts from the' witnesses. (See People v. Tuthill, 31 Ca1.2d 92. 97-98 [lS7 P.2d
16].) There is nothing to show that the police eonspirrd with
the federal agents to deprive defelldant of the stat"l1lt'l1 ts.
The pros!'clltion was therefore entitled to nse the testi mony
of the witnesses even though their signed statements were
l1TlayailabJc.
[4] The evidrnce concerning defendant's arrest SllOWS that
while on patrol on the afternoon of Friday, July 21, 1961,
Officrr DOllOyan of the Em!'ryville Police drove to a parking
area at the foot of Powell Street ill Emeryville ana th!'rc saw
defcndant standing between a linc of parked cars and the bay.
Hc asked defendant" if he l1ad some trouble," and defendant
rl'plied that he was on his lunch hour. Defendant also said
that he worked at the San Pablo Cleaners, and that his lunch
hour ended at 1 p.m. It was then 1 :18. Officer Donovan asked
for identification, and defendant took a money clip from his
pockct and produced a temporary driyer's license. Officer
Donovan saw in the money clip a red or maroon bank passbook and a folded pink piece of paper tllat he thought was a
check. He then wrote the name, address, and description from
the driver's license on a field interrogation card.
Officer Donovan connected the description on the driver's
license with a Berkeley Police bulletin that he had in his car
and that he had seen several times. The bulletin gave an
account of olle of the bank robberies for which defendant has
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be('n convirted and contained a description and composite
sketch of the robber. On the morning of JUly 21 Officer
Donovan had looked at another copy of the bulletin posted at
police h('adqnarters. Officer Donovan was also aware that
there had been a bank robbery on a previous Friday afternoon and tl1at a stolen car used in the commission· of the
robbery llad been abandoned afterward at the foot of Powell
Street.
When Officer Donovan completed the field interrogation
card, defendant told him that his car was parked up tIle
street and tllat he lmd additional information in it. Defend·
ant then voluntarily rode with Officer Donovan to defend·
ant's car. On the way Officer Donovan radioed headquarters
for assistance. TIle patrol car was parked behind defendant's
car, both men got out, and defendant (,lltered his rar throur~h
the rigllt front door and sat on the seat while Officer Dono.
van stood outside the open door. Defendant then took out his
money clip, rrmoved the pink paper, and put the paper in his
pocket. Officer Donovan asked what the paper was, and de.
fendant said that it was a check. After Officer Donovan asked
to see the check, defendant withdrew it from his pocket, put
it in his mouth, and rolled over face do,vn on the seat of the
car. After a struggle Officer Donovan arrested dcfcndant,
and both defendant and his car were searched. Incriminating
evidence obtained in the search was admitted at the trial over
defendant's objection.
Defendant's contention that he was arrested without probable cause cannot be sustained. The knowledge that a stolen
car had been used in a bank robbery and abandoned in the
Powell Strret parking area and the unlikely explanation defendant gavc for being there justified Officer Donovan's ask.
ing defendant for identification. (See People v. Micl.elson,
59 Ca1.2d 448, 450·451 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658].) Offi·
cer Donovan did nothing unreasonable in taking defendant
to his car, since defendant said he had further information
there and voluntarily rode in the patrol car. Having con·
nected defendant's description with the description on tne
police bulletin, Officer Donovan was justifi('d in asking to see
the check that defendant put in his pock{'t. With his suspi.
cion thus already justifiably aroused, Officer Donovan had
probable cause to make an arrest when dcff'ndant be~an
chewing the check. The srarch that follow{'d was incident to
the arrest and was therefore lawful. (People v. Mickelson,
59 Ca1.2d 448,451 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18,380 P.2d 658].)
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[5] We agree, however, with defendant's contention that
the methods used by the police in obtaining the chcck from
his mouth were unreasonable and in violation of due process.
(Rochin v. State of California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-173 [72
S.Ot. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183, 190-191, 25 .A.L.R.2d 1396, 14021403].) When defendant rolled over face down on the seat of
the ear, Officer Donovan entered the car and began wrestling
with him in an attempt to extricate the check. .At this point,
Officer Spongberg arrived in response to the call for assistance. Officer Spongberg leaned through the left front window
of defendant's car and with the fingers of both hands began
to press on defendant's cheeks. Defendant continued to chew
on the check. Officer Spongberg then took Officer Donovan's
police club and struck defendant twice on the back of the
neck. Defendant then spit out the bloody fragments of the
check.
The struggle lasted between five and seven minutes. It is
undisputed that defendant neither resisted arrest nor attempted to flee and that the officers' only objective in the
fray was to extract the check from defendant's mouth.
Under these circumstances the force used by the officers was
excessive. Choking a man to extract evidence from his mouth
violates due process. (People v. Erickson, 210 Cal..App.2d
177, 181-182 [26 Ca1.Rptr. 546] ; People v. Sevilla, 192 Cal.
App.2d 570, 573-578 [13 Ca1.Rptr. 714] ; People v. Martinez,
130 Ca1.App.2d 54 [278 P.2d 26].) Clubbing a man to obtain
evidence is equally brutal and offensive, and the check thus
obtained should not have been admitted into evidence.
It is clear, however, that even had the check been excluded
from evidence, the result would have been the same. .Although the cheek was relevant because in each of the three
bank robberies the robber used a pink piece of paper or a
check to demand money, it was merely cumulative of other
undisputed evidence in the record. Thus, its masticated remnants showed only that it was a check, a fact established by
the officer's testimony as to what he heard and saw before
any illegal conduct occurred and by defendant's own testimony at the trial. Moreover, the other evidence of defendant's guilt is overwhelming. Eyewitnesses to each of the robberies identified defendant as the robber. In one robb,'ry defendant escaped with a bank bag of money. Shortly thereafter, the owner of a car stolen from Golden Gate Fields S!lVl
defendant return the car. Defendant attempted to explain
that he thought the car was his, then got out of the car with
a money bag in his hand and fled. The evidence shows that
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the ear had been hot-wired. The car used in another of the
robberies and abandoned in the Powell Street parking area
had al80 been hot-wired, Defendant was experienced in hotwiring, and at the time of his arrest in the Powell Street area
was carrying the wires and tools customarily used in hotwiring. A gun and savings passbook like those found in defeudant's possession when he was arrested were used in one
or more of the robberies.
[6] Defendant contends, however, that the admission of !
the check in evidence constituted a denial of due process of
law and that therefore the harmless error rule cannot save·
the judgment. He invokes the rule that the admission of an
involuntary confession in evidence requires reversal regardless of other evidence of guilt presented to the jury.
(LYllumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [83 S.Ct. 917, 922, 9 L.Ed.
2d 922J ; Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-541 [81 S.Ct. i
735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 766-767] ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560, 567-568 [78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975, 980-981] ; Stroble
v. State of CaUfornia, 343 U.S. 181, 190 [72 S.Ct. 599, 96
hEd. 872, 880-881].) Almost invariably, however, a confession will constitute persuasive evidenee of guilt, and it is
therefore usually extremely difficult to determine what part
it played in securing the conviction. (See Payne v. Arkansas, ,
356 U.S. 560, 568 [78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975, 981] ; Allen,
Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for
Wolf, 1961 Sup,Ct.Rev. 1, 45; cf. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52, 55 [82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114, 116-117].) These
considerations justify treating involuntary confessions as a
class by themselves and refusing to inquire whether in rare
cases tlleir admission in evidence had no bearing on the
result.
Unlike involuntary confessions, other illegally obtained
evidence may be, as in this case, only a relatively insignificant part of the total evidence and have no effect on the
outcome of the trial. To require automatic reversal because of
its admission is to lose sight of the basic purpose of the
exclusionary rule to deter unconstitutional methods of law
enforcement. (Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 [80
S.Ct. 1437, 1453, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688, 1669] j Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 656 [81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090-10911;
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 443, 445 [282 P.2d 905, 50
A.L.R.2d 513].) Unless we were to take the unprecedentt'd
step of holding that the state must be penalized for violating
a defendant's constitutional rights in securing evidence by
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conferring an immunity upon him (see People v. Valenti, 49
Ca1.2d 199, 203 [316 P.2d 633J), we must consider the d<>terrent effect of the exclusionary rule not as a penalty but as
derived from the principle that the state must not profit
from its own wrong. (Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62,
64-65 [74 S.Ot. 354, 98 IJ.Ed. 503, 506-507]; McDonald v.
Un-ited States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 [69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153,
158-159]; People v. JIartin, 45 Ca1.2d 755, 760 [290 P.2d
855].) The state does not so profit when erroneously admitted
evidence does not affect the result of the trial. A reversal for
the admission of illegally obtained evidence without regard
for prejudice when there is compelling legally obtained evidence of guilt constitutE'S nothing more than a penalty, not
for the officer's illegal conduct in securing the evidence, but
solely for the prosecutor's blunder in offering it and the trial
court's error in admitting it. To require automatic reversal
for such harmless error could not help but generate pressure
to find that the unreasonable police conduct was lawful after
all and thereby to undermine constitutional standards of
police conduct to avoid needlE'ss retrial. (See People v.
Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448, 452 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d
658] ; People v. Ditson, 57 Ca1.2d 415, 439-440 [20 Cal.Rptr.
165, 369 P.2d 714].) An exclusionary rule so rigidly ad-i
ministered could thereby defeat itself. \Ve conclude that i
since there is no reasonable probability that the admission of
the check in evidence affected the result, the judgment must
be affirmed. (Cal.Const., art. VI, § 41j::!; People v. Tarantino
45 Ca1.2d 590, 595 [290 P.2d 505]; People v. Valenti, 49
Ca1.2d 199, 203 [316 P.2d 633J ; People v. Edgar, ante, p. 171
[32 Cal.Rptr. 41, 383 P.2d 449]; People v. Regalado, 193
Cal.App.2d 437, 442-443 [14 Cal.Rptr. 217]; People v.
Gardner, 177 Cal.App.2d 43, 46-47 [1 Cal.Rptr. 830J; see
People v. lV oods, 133 Cal.App.2d 187, 191-192 [283 P.2d
778J; People v. Morgan, 146 Cal.App.2d 722, 724 [304 P.2d
138].) Any implication to the contrary in People v. Erickson,
210 Cal.App.2d 177, 183 [26 Cal.Rptr. 546] is disapproved.
The jUdgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied October
16, 1963.
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